Ten Years After Brogan v. United States – An Empirical Look at the  False Statements  Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by Avsharian, Emilija
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Student Scholarship
1-1-2008
Ten Years After Brogan v. United States – An
Empirical Look at the "False Statements" Statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1001
Emilija Avsharian
Michigan State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/king
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Student Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation





TEN YEARS AFTER BROGAN V. UNITED STATES – AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT   






















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the  
King Scholar Program  
Michigan State University College of Law 
under the direction of  









Imagine that you suspect your loved one, your brother, is about to commit a crime.1  You 
suspect this because you read a letter in which he indicated so, and worried that he will go 
through with it, you rush to the airport to try to stop him.  But before you get to him, before you 
can talk to your brother and determine whether he is really serious about his intentions, and 
before you can convince him to change his mind, an FBI agent approaches you, and asks you 
about your brother and whether he is planning to commit this crime.  You get confused and do 
not know how to answer: on the one hand, you certainly want to prevent the crime from 
happening; but, on the other hand, it is your brother after all, and you hope that if you could just 
talk to him, you could convince him to change his mind and not go through with his intentions. 
What you do not know, is that you do not have to answer at all, because you have no duty to talk 
to the FBI agents who stopped you.2  You could just decline to cooperate and walk away.  But, 
you do not know this, and the FBI agents do not tell you that you do not have to answer.  They 
also do not tell you that if you do not answer truthfully, you could be in trouble yourself, even 
though until that point, you did not do anything wrong.  So, rather than tell the FBI agents the 
truth, you answer “regrettably, but humanly”3 that you are not sure, that your brother’s mental 
state worried you, but that you could not tell one way or another whether he intended to commit 
this crime.  At this point, you will have committed a federal felony, probably without even 
knowing, due to an extremely broad federal statute, “Statements or Entries Generally,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001, which criminalizes materially false statements made to the federal government, even 
when the person does not know that making such false statements constitutes a crime.  
                                                 
1 This example is based on the facts of one of the many plea agreements surveyed for purposes of this paper. See 
United States v. Subeh, 2007 WL 4664387 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).  
2 See infra note 62.  
3 See infra note 95.  
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Section 1001 criminalizes not only materially false statements such as described in the 
example above, but even a simple denial of wrongdoing is enough to satisfy the extremely low 
threshold of § 1001.  A little over ten years ago, the Supreme Court decided Brogan v. United 
States4 in which the Court affirmed the defendant’s felony conviction for falsely denying his 
involvement in a certain criminal scheme when questioned by federal agents at his home.5  The 
defendant was indicted and convicted on federal bribery charges6 and under § 1001. 18 U.S.C. § 
1001(a)7 provides:  
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the 
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of 
the United States, knowingly and willfully 
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a 
material fact; 
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation; or 
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to 
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
entry; 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years. . . .8
                                                 
4 Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998).  
5 Id. at 399 (for further discussion of Brogan facts, see infra part II). 
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(b)(1), (a)(2) and (d)(2). 
7 At the time defendant was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provided:  
“Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States 
knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material 
fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses 
any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent 
statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both.” 
18 U.S.C. § 1001 was amended in 1996 (see infra part I) to add the materiality requirement to every subsection 
under section (a).  Though the amended statute was arguably narrower than the one Brogan was convicted under, it 
is unlikely that the outcome would have been any different since the materiality element was subsequently 
interpreted to only require that the statement could have misled the investigator, as opposed to that it actually did.  
See infra note 48.  Thus, Brogan would have likely been convicted under the amended statute. 
8 Subsections (b) and (c) provide:  
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's counsel, for 
statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge 
or magistrate in that proceeding. 
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18 U.S.C. § 1001 has been interpreted as requiring proof of five elements: first, that the 
defendant made the statement as charged; second, that the statement was false; third, that the 
falsity related to a material matter; fourth, that the defendant acted willfully and with knowledge 
of the falsity; and fifth, that the false statement was made or used in relation to a matter within 
the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States.9   
The defendant in Brogan appealed his conviction under § 1001 and urged both the court 
of appeals10 and the Supreme Court to adopt the so-called “exculpatory no” doctrine,11 under 
which false denial of wrongdoing, though literally within the plain meaning of § 1001, would be 
excluded from § 1001’s scope.12  Both courts disagreed, and held that the literal meaning of § 
1001 does not exclude false denials of wrongdoing from its coverage.13  The decision was 
relatively uncontroversial as seven justices voted in favor of affirming the defendant’s 
conviction.14  However, Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion raising concerns regarding 
the “extraordinary authority” Congress has conferred “perhaps unwittingly, on prosecutors to 
manufacture crimes.”15  She noted that the wording of the statute gave power to the government 
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, subsection (a) shall 
apply only to-- 
(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter related to the procurement of 
property or services, personnel or employment practices, or support services, or a document 
required by law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office or officer within 
the legislative branch; or 
(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, 
subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House 
or Senate. 
For purposes of this paper, subsections (b) and (c) are not discussed. 
9 United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476, 484 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Brehm, 2007 WL 3311341 (M.D. Fla. 
2007).
10 United States v. Brogan, 96 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1996).
11 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401.   
12 For further discussion on the “exculpatory no” doctrine, see infra part II.  
13 Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. at 408; United States v. Brogan, 96 F.3d at 37. 
14 Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg voted in favor of affirming 
Brogan’s conviction.  Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented.  
15 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408.  
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agents “not simply to apprehend lawbreakers, but to generate felonies, crimes of a kind that only 
a Government officer could prompt.”16  
There have been many articles written about § 1001, the “exculpatory no” defense, and 
the likely impact the Brogan decision would have on the federal criminal justice system.17  
Commentators and legislators alike have raised concerns regarding the broad scope of § 1001 
long before the Supreme Court’s decision in Brogan, arguing that § 1001 “goes too far in many 
respects”18 and proposing that unsworn oral statements be excluded entirely from the threat of 
penalty under §1001.19  In 1970, almost thirty years before Brogan, the National Commission on 
Reform of Federal Criminal Law proposed unsuccessfully a revision to § 1001 that would have 
excluded statements made during the course of criminal investigations “unless the information is 
given in an official proceeding or the declarant is otherwise under a legal duty to give the 
information.”20 Although commentators largely agree with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the plain meaning of the statute in Brogan,21 they have criticized the Court for affirming 
Brogan’s conviction for “an innocuous violation that never materially impeded the government's 
investigation.”22  More generally, commentators have raised concerns regarding the impact 
Brogan would have on subsequent prosecutions under §1001, cautioning that § 1001 would “lurk 
                                                 
16 Id. at 409.  
17 Harry E. Garner, Criminal Law – 18 U.S.C. 1001- Abrogation of the “Exculpatory No” Doctrine, 66 TENN. L. 
REV. 561 (1999); Giles E. Birch, comment, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory 
No, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1273 (1990); Nathan Edwards, Brogan v. United States: A Critical Response to the Supreme 
Court’s Analysis of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147 (1999); Jeremy Baker, False Statements and 
False Claims, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427 (2005).  
18 Model Penal Code § 208.22, cmts. at 141-42 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957); Model Penal Code § 241.3 (Official 
Draft 1962).
19 Harry E. Garner, Criminal Law – 18 U.S.C. 1001- Abrogation of the “Exculpatory No” Doctrine, 66 TENN. L. 
REV. 561 (1999) (discussing proposals for amending § 1001). 
20 Id. (citing National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, New Federal Criminal Code § 1352 (Final 
Report 1971)).
21 Harry E. Garner, Criminal Law – 18 U.S.C. 1001- Abrogation of the “Exculpatory No” Doctrine, 66 TENN. L. 
REV. 561 (1999); Nathan Edwards, Brogan v. United States: A Critical Response to the Supreme Court’s Analysis of 
18 U.S.C.A § 1001, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147 (1999). 
22 Harry E. Garner, Criminal Law – 18 U.S.C. 1001- Abrogation of the “Exculpatory No” Doctrine, 66 TENN. L. 
REV. 561 (1999). 
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in the repertoire of the ‘over-zealous prosecutor.”23  Others have criticized the “haphazard, 
discretionary approach to federal criminal law”24 and argued that such haphazard criminal 
enforcement “threatens the integrity and efficacy of the law.”25
 These concerns, along with the relatively recent high profile cases of Martha Stewart26 
and disgraced Olympic athlete Marion Jones,27 both of whom have been convicted28 under § 
1001,  have prompted this investigation of the extent to which prosecutors rely on this 
extraordinarily broad criminal statute to convict individuals not for the underlying substantive 
crimes, but for basically lying.  In order to determine the validity of fears and predictions 
commentators expressed before and after Brogan, this paper seeks to establish an empirical basis 
for discussion on what should be done to ameliorate the potentially harsh consequences of 
criminalizing all materially false statements made to the government. The paper looks at more 
                                                 
23 Nathan Edwards, Brogan v. United States: A Critical Response to the Supreme Court’s Analysis of 18 U.S.C.A § 
1001, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147 (1999) (citing Petitioner's Brief at 18, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 
(1998) (No. 96-1579)).
24 Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. 
L & Criminology 643 (2006) (criticizing the federal criminal code as “duplicative, ambiguous, incomplete, and 
organizationally nonsensical”). 
25 Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells us about White Collar Criminal Law, 43 HOUS. L. 
REV. 591, 619 (2006) (raising concerns over the consequences of investigatory processes, the vagueness of criminal 
statutes, the breadth and depth of the criminal code, and the “enormous” prosecutorial discretion).  
26 Ms. Stewart allegedly engaged in insider trading which prompted Securities and Exchange Commission 
investigation. She was interviewed twice by the FBI and the SEC, once at the United States Attorney’s office, and 
once over the phone.  Ms. Stewart allegedly lied about the real reason for her sale of certain stocks in order to cover 
up what was possibly an illegal trade, claiming that she had an agreement with her broker to sell her stocks if they 
fell below a certain price.  At trial, the jury believed her claim that her sale of securities was pursuant to a 
preexisting agreement with her broker to sell if the stocks fell below a certain price as opposed to a result of insider 
trading, and acquitted her under that particular specification of the § 1001 charge.  However, because she was found 
to have lied with respect to other details of the investigation, which were immaterial from the securities law 
perspective, she was ultimately convicted for covering up conduct that turned out to be innocent.  See  United States 
v. Stewart, 323 F. Supp.2d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006).  
27 Marion Jones was indicted in the Southern District of New York under two counts of § 1001 for lying to federal 
investigators (1) when she said that she had never seen or ingested a performance enhancing drug, when supposedly 
she had seen and ingested such performance enhancing drugs; and (2) for stating she was unaware of certain 
$25,000 check to her when supposedly she was aware of that check and had in fact endorsed the check herself. 
Information, S6 05 Cr. 1067 (available at 
http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_documents/marion_jones/jones_charges.pdf). Jones subsequently pleaded 
guilty to both counts of § 1001 and was sentenced to six months in prison (available at 
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=988_1200079976).  
28 Martha Stewart was convicted under § 1001 after a trial; Marion Jones pleaded guilty to two counts of § 1001.  
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than 1300 plea agreements implicating § 1001 and seeks to draw empirical conclusions regarding 
the way in which prosecutors rely on the all encompassing nature of § 1001 to obtain guilty 
pleas.  Though most of the available § 1001 commentary seems to focus mainly on the peculiar 
factual scenario when the materially false statements are made in face to face encounters 
between defendants and federal investigators during criminal investigations (namely, false denial 
of wrongdoing),29 this paper seeks to go beyond the false denials of wrongdoing to establish a 
more comprehensive picture of how § 1001 is administered.   
Part I will give a brief overview of the history of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and its original 
purpose.  Part I will also examine how the problems that the statute was originally designed to 
address have changed since its enactment, and will question whether, in light of the extremely 
detailed federal criminal code now in existence, there is any further need for such a general,       
all-encompassing statute.  Part II will discuss the demise of the “exculpatory no” doctrine in 
Brogan v. United States. Though this paper does not focus solely on the “exculpatory no” 
defense, the Brogan decision is the Supreme Court’s major interpretation of § 1001 and it offers 
a good overview of the arguments offered in favor and against the expansive reading of § 1001. 
Therefore, both the majority opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence will be addressed in 
some detail.  Part II will also discuss concerns raised by commentators regarding § 1001, both 
before the Brogan decision and in the years following.  Finally, Part II will discuss some of the 
proposals for reform commentators have made in light of § 1001’s broad scope.  Part III will 
discuss the empirical data regarding the use of § 1001 in obtaining plea agreements.  Namely, 
Part III will discuss the use of § 1001 to “pile on” offenses;30 prosecutorial restraint from 
charging § 1001 when the conduct clearly falls within the scope of § 1001; the number of 
                                                 
29 This undoubtedly is one of the most disconcerting problems of § 1001’s extremely broad scope and will be 
addressed in this paper extensively.  
30 See infra note 117.  
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instances when § 1001 is the sole count of conviction; the practice of charging § 1001 even when 
there is a substantive crime on point; and the frequency with which warnings are given in face to 
face encounters between defendants and federal investigators.  In light of the empirical 
conclusions, Part IV will evaluate several commentators’ proposals for achieving just and 
consistent application of § 1001, such as Congressional amendments requiring that knowledge of 
unlawfulness be an element of the crime;31 warnings that making materially false statements 
constitutes a federal felony32 which in turn would satisfy the knowledge requirement; redefining 
the materiality element;33 and changing the level offense from felony to misdemeanor.34  The 
paper also proposes requiring prosecutors to charge the substantive offense whenever possible, 
rather than rely on § 1001.   
I. THE HISTORY OF § 1001 AND ITS ORIGINAL PURPOSE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW  
18 U.S.C. § 1001 was originally enacted in 186335  during the Civil War to prohibit 
persons in military service from filing fraudulent claims against the government.36  In 1874, 
Congress expanded the coverage of the statute to prohibit filing of fraudulent claims by any 
person,37 not just military personnel. Two more revisions followed in 1918,38 one that included 
corporations into class of “persons” who could be liable under the statute; and a second that 
broadened the types of prohibited fraudulent conduct to cover purposeful and intentional 
“cheating and swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States.”39  Though the 1918 
amendments seemingly expanded the scope of § 1001’s coverage, the 1926 Supreme Court 
                                                 
31 See infra note 134. 
32 See infra note 120. 
33 See infra note 136.  
34 See infra note 135.  
35 See Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 696-97 (1863).  
36 Jeffrey L. God, Demise of the Little White Lie Defense – The Supreme Court Rejects the “Exculpatory No” 
Doctrine Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001: Brogan v. United States, 118 S. CT. 805 (1998), 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 859 (1999). 
37 Id.  
38 Act of Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015, 1015-16 (1918). 
39 Id.  
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decision in United States v. Cohn40 interpreted the phrase “cheating and swindling or defrauding” 
to only include instances of “cheating the Government out of property or money.”41  Thus, 
despite the 1918 amendments, the scope of the prohibited conduct remained relatively narrow as 
it required showing of some pecuniary harm.  This restricted interpretation of the 1918 act 
became a serious problem with the “advent of the New Deal programs:”42
The new regulatory agencies relied heavily on self-reporting to assure 
compliance; if regulated entities could file false reports with impunity, 
significant Government interests would be subverted even though the 
Government would not be deprived of any property or money. The 
Secretary of the Interior, in particular, expressed concern that “there were 
at present no statutes outlawing, for example, the presentation of false 
documents and statements to the Department of the Interior in connection 
with the shipment of ‘hot oil,’ or to the Public Works Administration in 
connection with the transaction of business with that agency.43
 
Congress responded in 1934 and amended the statute to remove the requirement of 
financial fraud, thus criminalizing false statements that did not result in any pecuniary harm.44  
However, despite removing the pecuniary harm element, the purpose of the statute remained 
limited “to protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the 
perversion which might result from deceptive practices,”45 and more specifically, from 
“affirmative, aggressive and voluntary actions of persons who take the initiative.”46  Thus, 
the 1934 amendment was designed to address concerns “quite far removed from suspects' false 
                                                 
40 270 U.S. 339 (1926).  
41 Id. (emphasis added).  
42 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 412.  
43 Id. (quoting United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 80 (1984) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)). 
44 Id. at 413. Subsequently, the Supreme Court repeatedly recognized that “the 1934 Act was passed at the behest of 
‘the Secretary of the Interior to aid the enforcement of laws relating to the functions of the Department of the 
Interior.’” (Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 707 (1995) quoting United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86,  93-
94 (1941)).  
45 United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991).
46 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 413 (quoting Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1962) (emphasis 
added)). 
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denials of criminal misconduct, in the course of informal interviews initiated by Government 
agents.”47
The statute was subsequently amended several times, most significantly in 1996 when the 
statute was completely revised to include among other things a materiality requirement48 in each 
subsection under section (a).49  But the underlying principle remained the same: it was criminal 
to make false statements to the government regardless of whether such false statements caused 
any pecuniary harm.  Since dispensing with the pecuniary harm requirement in 1934, 18 U.S.C. § 
1001 has been applied broadly in many different contexts, such as in investigations by Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and Secret Service,50 United States Attorney's Office,51 SEC,52 Federal 
Housing Administration,53 and Bureau of Customs.54  In light of that, § 1001 has been viewed as 
affording great flexibility to government when seeking prosecution due to its low standard for 
                                                 
47 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 413-14. 
48 See generally Michael Gomez, Re-Examining the False Statements Accountability Act, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 515, 523 
(2000) (stating that “courts have considered a statement to be material if it had a natural tendency or capacity to 
influence a decision or a federal agency function. It is not necessary that the statement actually influence anyone.”). 
Though arguably the materiality element was supposed to limit the scope of § 1001, the rather broad interpretation 
of materiality adopted by the federal courts makes this element hardly an obstacle to a conviction.  
49 See supra note 7 for the language of the statute prior to the 1996 amendments.   
50 United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984) (reversing dismissal of the defendant’s indictment for falsely 
telling the FBI and Secret Service that his wife had been kidnapped and that she had been involved in a plot to 
assassinate the president). 
51 United States v. Tracy, 108 F.3d 473, 477 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming defendant’s conviction for making false 
statements to the Assistant United States Attorney during negotiations to settle seizure warrant pending in federal 
court). 
52 United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming defendant’s conviction for making false 
statements on Schedule 13D and Schedule 14D-1 submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission). 
53 Preuit v. United States, 382 F.2d 277, 277-78 (9th Cir. 1967) (affirming defendant’s conviction for loaning 
purchasers the down payments necessary for obtaining Federal Housing Authority loans, and then submitting forms 
indicating that purchasers had paid the down payment in cash). 
54 United States v. Haim, 218 F. Supp. 922, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (affirming defendant’s conviction for illegal 
importation of Dutch whiskey into United States under the guise that Dutch whiskey was “Scotch” whiskey). 
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criminal liability,55 and has been used by the government to “trap persons whose guilt is 
otherwise difficult to establish.”56   
As indicated, the original purpose of § 1001 was rather narrow, and it applied only to 
persons in military service.57  At the time the original statute was enacted, the need for it was 
arguably greater than it is today.  Though the exact numbers are rather difficult to find, it is safe 
to assume that the number of federal criminal statutes must have been minuscule in 1863 
compared to the contemporary federal criminal code.58  As the Secretary of Interior stated in the 
1930s, the were “no statutes outlawing . . . presentation of false documents and statements to the 
Department of the Interior.”59  Today, however, Congress regulates criminal conduct pervasively 
and there is a particular federal criminal statute addressing almost every possible crime.  In those 
instances where § 1001 is used, more often than not, there is a specific federal criminal statute on 
point. 60  Therefore, § 1001 is no longer necessary to preserve the integrity of federal government 
programs61 as there are specific criminal statutes proscribing the vast majority of the conduct the 
original § 1001 was designed to prevent.62  As Justice Ginsburg noted in her discussion of 
                                                 
55 Michael S. McGarry, Winning the War on Procurement Fraud: Victory at What Price, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 269, 274 (1993). 
56 Peter W. Morgan, The Underfined Crime of Lying to Congress: Ethics Reform and the Rule of Law, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 177, 198-99 (1992). 
57 See supra, note 33.   
58 For an excellent discussion on the proliferation of criminal codes, see generally Erik Luna, The 
Over-criminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005).  
59 See supra note 40.  
60 Examples include making false statements to the Housing and Urban Development Authority, which is punishable 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1012; making false statements in connection with identification documents, which is punishable 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1028; making false statements in application for passport, which is punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 
1542; making false statements on federal tax returns, which is punishable under 26 U.S.C. § 7206, etc.  See also 
Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells us about White Collar Criminal Law, 43 HOUS. L. 
REV. 591, 619 (2006) (stating that “the code reportedly contains at least 100 false statement statutes and over 325 
fraud statutes”).
61 See supra p. 8, for discussion on the historic necessity for § 1001 in light of the New Deal government programs 
which relied heavily on self reporting to ensure compliance.  
62 Id.  As previously described, the original § 1001 targeted “affirmative, aggressive and voluntary actions of 
persons.” Now, however, there are specific criminal statutes covering most of the conduct that should fall within the 
scope of § 1001, namely affirmative conduct such as making false statements to the Housing and Urban 
Development Authority, making false statements in application for passport, and making false statements on federal 
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“exculpatory no” doctrine,63 simple denials of guilt are “far removed . . . from the problems 
Congress initially sought to address when it proscribed falsehoods designed to elicit a benefit 
from the Government or to hinder Government operations.”64    
II. THE DEMISE OF THE “EXCULPATORY NO” DEFENSE IN BROGAN V. UNITED STATES 
Brogan remains the most influential Supreme Court decision regarding § 1001.  Though 
the precise issue in Brogan was relatively narrow and focused mainly on the “exculpatory no” 
doctrine, the decision dealt extensively with statutory interpretation of § 1001, as well as many 
constitutional and policy implications.  Therefore, Brogan serves as a logical starting point for 
any substantive discussion on § 1001.  
1. The Facts and the Brief Procedural History 
Brogan was convicted under § 1001 for falsely answering “no” when federal agents asked 
him whether he had received any cash or gift from a company whose employees were represented 
by a union in which he was an officer.65  After Brogan answered “no,” the federal agents told 
Brogan that an earlier search of the employer’s premises had produced company records showing 
the contrary.66  At that point, the agents told Brogan that lying to federal agents in the course of 
an investigation was a crime.67  Brogan did not change his answer68 and the interview ended.  
                                                                                                                                                             
tax returns, see supra note 60.  One type of conduct that would arguably not be punishable under any other statute is 
the one where § 1001’s use is the most problematic, namely, making materially false statements during criminal 
investigations.  However, this is largely due to the fact that such conduct should not, arguably, be criminalized at all, 
as it is contrary to the principle that a person approached by a law enforcement officer need not answer any question 
put to him unless there is reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he committed a crime. Since suspects are more 
likely to lie than to remain silent, see infra note 105, criminalizing such materially false statements is imposing a 
duty on suspect to cooperate with the police – a duty that they do not have. See generally M. Christine Klein, A Bird 
Called Hiibel: The Criminalization of Silence, 2004 CATO S. CT. REV. 357 (2004). 
63 See infra part II (Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence).   
64 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408, 409.  
65 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 398.  
66 Id. at 399-400.  
67 Id. at 400.  
68 Id. (the fact that Brogan did not change his answer is irrelevant for purposes of § 1001 analysis.  Courts have held 
that it is immaterial whether defendants subsequently change their story. Since materiality element of § 1001 is 
judged at the point of time when the statements were uttered,  so long as the statements “could have influenced 
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On appeal, Brogan urged both the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, as well as the United 
States Supreme Court to adopt the so-called exculpatory no doctrine, “which excludes from § 
1001’s scope false statements that consist of the mere denial of wrongdoing.”69  At the time of 
his appeal, there were at least seven circuits that had adopted some sort of “exculpatory no” 
defense,70 though as the Supreme Court pointed out, there was “considerable variation among the 
Circuits concerning, among other things, what degree of elaborated tale-telling carries a 
statement beyond simple denial.”71  Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court rejected 
Brogan’s arguments and affirmed his conviction.  
2. The Majority Opinion 
 Brogan argued several points in favor of overturning his conviction. His first argument 
was based on the premise that § 1001 was designed to criminalize materially false statements that 
“prevent governmental functions.” 72  He attempted to distinguish “believed” false statements to 
government investigators which, according to Brogan, perverted governmental functions from 
“disbelieved” false denials of guilt which, in Brogan’s view, did not pervert governmental 
functions.  Therefore, Brogan argued, § 1001 did not “criminalize simple denials of guilt to 
                                                                                                                                                             
federal agents in their investigation” at the time they were made, defendants are liable under § 1001 even if they 
subsequently change their story). United States v. Sebaggala, 256 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2001) (declining to “transplant” 
the recantation defense available under the perjury statute 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) into the “unreceptive soil of § 
1001”).  
69 Id. at 398. 
70 Id. at 401, citing Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469, 473-474 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 
801, 805 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 717-19 (11th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 880-81 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-84 (1st 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
71 Id. at 401. Some courts protected defendants only if they merely said “NO.” Others protected defendants’ more 
elaborate responses.  Considering that the “exculpatory no” doctrine developed as a judicially created exception 
designed to curtail the extraordinarily broad scope of § 1001 while at the same time preserving the applicability of § 
1001 to fact situations where Congress intended it to apply, see generally 102 A.L.R. Fed. 742 § 2, it is not 
surprising that the law did not develop uniformly: “[w]hether a particular false statement falls within the 
"exculpatory no" exception appears to be a matter of the circumstances of the case and the law of the Circuit 
pertaining to the exception.” Id.
72 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401 (perversion of government functions, as discussed in part I, has traditionally been viewed 
as the main justification for the exceedingly broad scope of § 1001). 
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Government investigators,”73 unless the investigators actually believed such statements.  Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, dismissed Brogan’s first arguments as based on mistaken 
premises.74  Justice Scalia saw “the investigation of wrongdoing to uncover truth”75 as an 
important governmental function and he refused to see a distinction between “disbelieved”76 
falsehood, which according to Brogan would not impede the governmental investigative 
function77 and “believed” falsehood.  Justice Scalia stated that it would be “exceedingly strange” 
to “make the existence of this crime turn upon the credulousness of the federal investigator (or 
the persuasiveness of the liar).”78  While Brogan argued that § 1001 should be limited to exclude 
those instances where “a perversion of governmental functions does not exist,”79 Justice Scalia 
maintained that the statute forbade all “deceptive practices” regardless of whether they actually 
impeded any government function.80   
Next, Brogan argued that “exculpatory no” doctrine was inspired by the Fifth 
Amendment,81 as the literal reading of § 1001 puts a “‘cornered suspect’ in the ‘cruel trilemma’ 
of admitting guilt, remaining silent, or falsely denying guilt.”82  Justice Scalia replied that “this 
‘trilemma’ is wholly of the guilty suspect's own making, of course” and that “an innocent person 
will not find himself in a similar quandary.”83  Justice Scalia went on to give a more legally 
sound explanation of his rejection of the Fifth Amendment argument.  He reasoned that the Fifth 
                                                 
73 Id. at 402.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. (emphasis in the original).  
77 In Brogan’s case, the federal agents did not believe his statements denying his guilt as they already had evidence 
to the contrary.  
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 403.  
80 Id. at 403-404 (citing United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941)). 
81 The relevant part of the Fifth Amendment states: “nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.  
82 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 404.  
83 Id.  
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Amendment allows a suspect to remain silent, but it did not allow a witness to “swear falsely.”84 
Thus, in Justice Scalia’s view, the Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination did not 
serve to protect a defendant who, in an effort not to incriminate himself, falsely denied his guilt.85
Finally, Brogan urged the Court to adopt a more limited interpretation of § 1001 in order 
to “eliminate the grave risk that § 1001 will become an instrument of prosecutorial abuse.”86 
Brogan argued that “overzealous prosecutors will use this provision as a means of ‘piling on’ 
offenses - sometimes punishing the denial of wrongdoing more severely than the wrongdoing 
itself.”87  Justice Scalia, once again, dismissed Brogan’s argument.  First, Justice Scalia, argued 
that this is not the fault of some “hypothetical prosecutor” but Congress,88 and that it was up to 
Congress to limit the scope of § 1001, if it so chose.  Second, Scalia argued that Petitioner could 
not point to “any history of prosecutorial excess.”89   
Justice Scalia concluded the majority opinion by stating there was nothing to support a 
more limited reading of § 1001. In his view, the Court was not at liberty to impose its own 
limitations on legislation, “no matter how alluring the policy arguments for doing so.”90  As he 




                                                 
84 Id.  
85 The extraordinary scope of this holding should be obvious. It is hard to imagine a criminal interrogation in which 
a defendant would not at least at some point profess his innocence. According to Justice Scalia, even in those 
circumstances, defendants’ claims of innocence would fall within § 1001.   
86 Id. at 405.  
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id. This doubt regarding the prevalence of prosecutorial abuse, among other things, prompted the writing of this 
paper.  
90 Id. at 408. 
91 Id.  
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3. Justice Ginsburg’s Concurrence 
Though Justice Ginsberg concurred, somewhat reluctantly, based on the plain meaning of 
the text, her concern with the expansive use of § 1001 is evident.  She addressed many of the 
problems associated with § 1001 and raised by Brogan on appeal.  She began her concurrence 
with the statement that Congress has conferred “extraordinary authority, perhaps unwittingly, on 
prosecutors to manufacture crimes.”92  She noted that the wording of the statute gave power to 
the government agents “not simply to apprehend lawbreakers, but to generate felonies, crimes of 
a kind that only a Government officer could prompt”: 93
Since agents may often expect a suspect to respond falsely to their 
questions, the statute is a powerful instrument with which to trap a potential 
defendant. Investigators need only informally approach the suspect and 
elicit a false reply and they are assured of a conviction with a harsh penalty 
even if they are unable to prove the underlying substantive crime. 
 
Justice Ginsburg further illustrated this point with the facts of the case United States v. Tabor,94 
where the IRS agents confronted a notary public who had violated the Florida law by notarizing a 
deed even though two signatories had not personally appeared before her.  When she “regrettably 
but humanly” denied this, the Government prosecuted her under § 1001, thus turning a violation 
of state law into a federal felony “by eliciting a lie that misled no one.”95  Justice Ginsburg also 
noted the Solicitor General’s forthright observations during the oral arguments that § 1001 could 
even be used to “‘escalate completely innocent conduct into a felony.’”96  Furthermore, this is 
most likely to occur if  
if an investigator finds it difficult to prove some elements of a crime, she 
can ask questions about other elements to which she already knows the 
                                                 
92 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408.  
93 Id. (quoting note, Fairness in Criminal Investigations Under the Federal False Statement Statute, 77 COLUM. L. 
REV. 316, 325-326 (1977)).
94 788 F.2d 714 (11th Cir. 1986). 
95 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 410.  
96 Id. at 411 (quoting Tr. Of Oral Arg. At 36).  
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answers. If the suspect lies, she can then use the crime she has prompted as 
leverage or can seek prosecution for the lie as a substitute for the crime she 
cannot prove.97
 
Justice Ginsburg commented that the facts of Tabor as well as Brogan’s situation are “not 
altogether uncommon episodes”98 and may occur under “‘extremely informal circumstances 
which do not sufficiently alert the person interviewed to the danger that false statements may 
lead to a felony conviction.’”99  She went on to say:  
Because the questioning occurs in a noncustodial setting, the suspect is not 
informed of the right to remain silent. Unlike proceedings in which a false 
statement can be prosecuted as perjury, there may be no oath, no pause to 
concentrate the speaker's mind on the importance of his or her 
answers. As in Brogan's case, the target may not be informed that a false 
“No” is a criminal offense until after he speaks.100
 
In closing, Justice Ginsburg urged the Congress to adopt measures to “block the statute’s use as a 
generator of crime while preserving the measure’s important role in protecting the workings of 
Government.”101
4. Commentators’ Views on Brogan and § 1001 
 
Even before Brogan, commentators had written about § 1001, criticizing its extraordinary 
breadth.102  Commentators have argued that one of the most controversial uses of § 1001 is in 
                                                 
97 Id.  
98 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 410, fn. 2. Justice Ginsburg gave the following examples of agents questioning defendants to 
obtain incriminating statements: United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1960) (“defendant prosecuted 
for falsely denying, while effectively detained by agents, that he participated in illegal gambling; court concluded 
that “purpose of the agents was not to investigate or to obtain information, but to obtain admissions,” and that “they 
were not thereafter diverted from their course by alleged false statements of defendant”); United States v. Dempsey, 
740 F. Supp. 1299, 1306 (N.D.Ill.1990) (after determining what charges would be brought against defendants, 
agents visited them “with the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements;” when the agents “received denials 
from certain defendants rather than admissions,” Government brought § 1001 charges); see also United States v. 
Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1976) (agents asked defendant had he made any out-of-state purchases, 
investigators already knew he had, he stated he had not; based on that false statement, defendant was prosecuted for 
violating § 1001).
99 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 410-11 (quoting United States v. Ehrlichman, 379 F. Supp. 291, 292 (D.D.C. 
1974)).  
100 Id. (emphasis added; italics in the original).  
101Id. at 418.   
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situations when suspects “lie to federal agents during criminal investigations.”103  One author 
argued that using § 1001 in such situations perverts the information-gathering purpose of the 
statute because investigators, relying on the fact that “guilty suspects asked incriminating 
questions are very likely to lie . . . seem to prefer those lies to silence.”104  Since the suspects are 
almost certain to lie,105 the author argued, this allowed “investigators to set up violations that 
they fully expect to occur.”106  Thus, rather than using § 1001 as a shield “to protect agency 
information-gathering” functions,”107 the prosecutors can rely on § 1001 as a sword to obtain 
convictions for conduct that is otherwise hard to prove.108  
After Brogan, commentators debated the effects the decision would have on prosecutorial 
reliance on § 1001. Though most authors seemed to agree that the decision correctly interpreted 
the plain meaning of the statute,109 commentators criticized the piecemeal evolution of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
102 See supra note 17.  
103 Giles E. Birch, comment, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory No, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1273 (1990) (arguing that the § 1001 allows “the authority to force suspects to admit their guilt either by 
words or by silence” and that this “is an unusual power in the hands of an investigative agent.” Id. at 1295. Though 
this comment was written long before Brogan was decided, it raises the same concerns as the Brogan decision 
addressed). See also notes 16 -24 (describing concerns regarding the broad scope of § 1001). 
104 Id. at 1273.  
105 Id. at 1277.  
106 Id. at 1277.  
107 Id. at 1276.  
108 This practice is further disconcerting considering the questionable power of federal investigators to “demand that 
[they] not be lied to.” Id. at 1276. Though lying to the police is “obviously objectionable,” id. at 1275, traditionally 
police authority did not “include the power to punish suspects who lie.” Id. On the contrary, criminal investigations 
are like a “traditional dance:”  
Columbo asks the suspect questions; the suspect tells inventive and plausible lies; Columbo 
doggedly uncovers the truth and confronts the perpetrator with the growing evidence of his 
guilt; the lies become less persuasive; Columbo proves his case; and the suspect confesses. 
The suspect's role is to evade detection as much as Columbo's role is to unravel the web of 
his deceit.  
Id. at fn. 14. 
109 See Harry E. Garner, Criminal Law – 18 U.S.C. 1001- Abrogation of the “Exculpatory No” Doctrine, 66 TENN. 
L. REV. 561 (1999) (arguing that “the Court's decision in Brogan v. United States is neither surprising nor 
unjustifiable”); Nathan Edwards, Brogan v. United States: A Critical Response to the Supreme Court’s Analysis of 
18 U.S.C.A § 1001, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147 (1999) (arguing that “to the extent that one agrees with Justice 
Scalia that § 1001 is phrased unambiguously, the ultimate rejection of the “exculpatory no” defense was sound). 
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statute,110 fearing that the Supreme Court’s approval of prosecutions for falsely denying 
wrongdoing “under the broad language of § 1001”111 would lead to increased reliance on § 
1001.112  On the other hand, some commentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s refusal to 
adopt the “exculpatory no” defense in Brogan would not have a large impact in light of the 
extreme breadth of § 1001.113  One author argued that since the “exculpatory no” defense 
covered a very limited set of circumstances,114 it was “like the proverbial needle in a haystack,    
. . . not capable of taking to task § 1001's full potential for abuse.”115  However, the author 
recognized that even so, “§ 1001 [would] lurk in the repertoire of the ‘over-zealous 
prosecutor.’”116  
Another concern often raised about § 1001 is the possibility that a single lie can lead to 
multiple counts of offense, the so called “pilling on,” when “[e]very time a lie is repeated during 
an investigation, a separate count of the crime may be charged.”117  This practice, one author 
argued, “does not necessarily aid in truth-finding during trial” and if anything, such multiple 
counts are “used to leverage plea agreements, as prosecutors ‘give up’ some counts in return for 
                                                 
110 Michael Gomez, Re-Examining the False Statements Accountability Act, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 515, 523 (2000) 
(arguing that § 1001 is an example of how “statutes can evolve piecemeal, enacted to address one need and then 
developing into something completely different--taking small steps over the span of many years--with no one 
noticing the encompassing breadth that has ultimately accrued.”). 
111 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 415.  
112 Harry E. Garner, Criminal Law – 18 U.S.C. 1001- Abrogation of the “Exculpatory No” Doctrine, 66 TENN. L. 
REV. 561 (1999) (arguing that “one immediate effect of the Brogan decision is that federal prosecutors now have a 
useful tool with which to pursue convictions for making false statements” and that this would lead to “an increasing 
number of section 1001 prosecutions that the government can maintain in the absence of the ‘exculpatory no’”).
113 Nathan Edwards, Brogan v. United States: A Critical Response to the Supreme Court’s Analysis of 18 U.S.C.A § 
1001, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147 (1999).  
114 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (describing how different circuit courts had adopted different 
interpretations of the doctrine).   
115 Nathan Edwards, Brogan v. United States: A Critical Response to the Supreme Court’s Analysis of 18 U.S.C.A § 
1001, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147 (1999). 
116 Id. at 190.  
117 Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells us about White Collar Criminal Law, 43 HOUS. L. 
REV. 591, 619 (2006). 
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the plea.”118  While these practices might be legally permissible, the author suggested that such 
“a win-at-any-cost attitude” on the part of the government can harm the criminal justice system 
in the long term and “may offend the community's sense of fairness.”119
5. Proposals for Reform  
Concerned with the breadth of § 1001, both before and certainly after Brogan, 
commentators had suggested several proposals for ameliorating the potentially harsh 
consequences of the extremely wide application of § 1001.  Several commentators have 
suggested that criminal prosecution be permitted only if “the target has been warned that any lie 
can be a breach of federal law.”120  One author suggested an affirmative defense of “induced 
lie,”121 which would preclude criminal prosecution in those instances where defendant’s 
response was not required and investigators failed to warn the interviewee “that lying is a crime 
and that silence is permissible.”122  The author suggests that relying merely on the protections 
offered by Miranda warnings is not enough for two reasons.  First, though the Miranda warnings 
can warn a suspect of his right to remain silent, they are required only in custodial interrogations.  
Thus, “suspects questioned before arrest need not be warned”123 and some suspects will not 
know that they have a right to remain silent.  Second, and more importantly, even if warned of 
their right to remain silent, suspects “are unlikely to know of the punishment in store for them if 
                                                 
118 Id. (noting that double jeopardy would not remedy this problem due to the restrictive test adopted by the Supreme 
Court, focusing on the elements of the statutes at issue. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). 
See also United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 108-10 (1985) (holding that charging defendant with false 
statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and failing to report transportation of currency under 31 U.S.C. § 1058 did not 
violate the double jeopardy clause).
119 Id.  
120 Michael Gomez, Re-Examining the False Statements Accountability Act, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 515, 557 (2000); 
Giles E. Birch, comment, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory No, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1273 (1990).  
121 Giles E. Birch, comment, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory No, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1273 (1990). 
122 Id. at 1274.  
123 Id.  
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they lie.”124  Thus, a guilty suspect aware of his right to remain silent, but unaware that making 
materially false statements is a federal felony is “very likely to lie”125 and not only by professing 
his innocence, but offering “more than a flat denial.”126  Therefore, to increase compliance with 
§ 1001’s purpose of “information gathering,”127 investigators should warn all interviewees of the 
risk of prosecution under § 1001 if they lie as opposed to merely warning suspects who are in 
custody that they have the right to remain silent.  
To curtail the prosecutorial practice of “pilling on”128 which seeks to maximize the 
probability of conviction, two commentators, prompted by Ms. Stewart’s case,129 have proposed 
the so called “law of counts” to curtail the “redundant charging phenomenon” in order to “cabin 
prosecutorial charging discretion.”130  The law of counts would address the ad hoc approach to 
substantive federal criminal law,131 which is full of overlapping and redundant statutes, by a 
court conducted pre-trial review of the indictment to determine “if the charges in it were 
duplicative and overlapping in a manner jeopardizing the defendant's right to a fair trial”132 and 
to merge “all counts that deal with the same conduct or transaction.”133
                                                 
124 Id.   
125 Id.  
126 Id.  
127 Inducing lies in the view of this author does not amount to information gathering. See supra, notes 104-108.   
128 See supra note 117.  
129 Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal Prosecutorial Power and the Need for 
a Law of Counts, 109 PENN ST. L. REV.  1107, 1113 (2005) (stating that “the decisions to investigate Martha Stewart 
and prosecute her for her cover-up was justifiable.” However, “the number and type of charges filed against her” 
were more troublesome. Noting that Ms. Stewart was charged with five separate counts, the authors argue that “[t]he 
indictment in the Stewart case is an illustration of the tremendous power prosecutors have to shape the contours of a 
crime and to split it up--perhaps arbitrarily--into many different but overlapping counts”).
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 1119 (describing the development of the federal criminal law as a political and reactionary process, and 
arguing that “Congress addresses criminal issues from a political standpoint and passes criminal laws to satisfy the 
outrage of the day. It pays scant attention to how the new statutes fit with the old ones.”). 
132 Id.  
133 Id.  
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Other proposals included making knowledge of unlawfulness “a necessary component of 
§ 1001's willfulness element,”134 reducing the grade of § 1001 violations to misdemeanor 
level,135 and changing the materiality standard to require that “the false statement actually 
mislead or obstruct the government's investigation.”136   
With these concerns and proposals for reform in mind, the paper now turns to the 
empirical data exploring the prevalence of prosecutorial reliance on § 1001.  
 
III. EMPIRICAL DATA REGARDING PROSECUTORIAL RELIANCE ON § 1001 
As described in Part II, soon after the Brogan decision, many commentators weighed in 
on the debate regarding the fairness of § 1001’s broad scope, and attempted to predict how § 
1001 would be applied in the future in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling.137  Ten years later, 
this paper seeks to determine the validity of the concerns expressed regarding the potential for 
prosecutorial abuse of § 1001.  The results of the survey seek to address not only those instances 
where § 1001 is used to punish false denials of wrongdoing, but also to offer a more 
comprehensive understanding of the ways in which § 1001 is administered.  
1.  The Scope of the Research 
The empirical portion of this paper surveys about 1300 plea agreements138  implicating § 
1001 that were available on Westlaw139 from January until March, 2008. The plea agreements 
                                                 
134 Nathan Edwards, Brogan v. United States: A Critical Response to the Supreme Court’s Analysis of 18 U.S.C.A § 
1001, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147 (1999). 
135 Id.  
136 Harry E. Garner, Criminal Law – 18 U.S.C. 1001- Abrogation of the “Exculpatory No” Doctrine, 66 TENN. L. 
REV. 561 (1999).  
137 See supra part II.  
138 Though a number of all the convictions under § 1001 (both convictions obtained after trials as well as all of the 
plea agreements) would have represented a more complete picture regarding the frequency with which § 1001 is 
utilized, such data is difficult to come by and was outside the scope of the limited nature of this paper.  Furthermore, 
plea agreements are vastly more common in our criminal justice system anyway and they tend to be the rule, rather 
than the exception.  Therefore, unless convictions by trial systematically produce results different than those 
 22
were complied by using the Westlaw “KeyCite” function,140 resulting in 1311 plea agreements, 
covering fifty four districts141 in thirty one states,142 and ranging from 1998 until 2008.143   
The survey of the plea agreements sought to uncover patterns in prosecutorial reliance on 
§ 1001 in the following circumstances: 1) to induce guilty pleas by charging and subsequently 
dismissing § 1001, or promising not to charge § 1001; 2) to obtain guilty pleas solely under § 
1001; and 3) to obtain guilty pleas when the alleged violations occurred in face to face encounters 
between defendants and federal investigators and no warnings were given that making materially 
false statements constituted a federal felony. The specific parameters were: 1) whether a 
defendant pleaded guilty under § 1001; 2) whether a defendant pleaded guilty solely to § 1001 
and to no substantive charge; 3) whether a defendant pleaded guilty both to § 1001 and to other 
substantive charges; 4) when a defendant pleaded guilty to § 1001, did the government dismiss, 
or specifically promise not to file other charges; 5) whether § 1001 count was dismissed in return 
for a guilty plea under another count; 6) whether the plea agreement reflected a promise not the 
charge a defendant with § 1001 in return for a guilty plea for a different crime; 7) whether the 
                                                                                                                                                             
reflected by these findings, the survey of the plea agreements probably represents a fairly accurate picture regarding 
the administration of § 1001.  
139 A cursory look at LexisNexis didn’t result in finding of any such agreements.  
140 KeyCite is a function that offers the history of any particular statute along with citing references. The precise 
method of this research was as follows: The author first “key cited” § 1001, and then performed a citing references 
search of § 1001, which produced more than 28,000 results. Those results included numerous cases, secondary 
sources, administrative decisions, numerous court documents, including motions, fillings, briefs, and finally 
“verdicts, agreements, & settlements” - the database this paper focuses on. At the time the research for this paper was 
completed on March 18th 2008, there were 1341 documents in the category of “verdicts, agreements, & settlements.” 
During the several months of researching for this paper, Westlaw had added more than 200 more documents under 
the heading “verdicts, agreements, & settlements” and this process seems to be continuing. Any further research of 
this topic would likely render a more complete profile of the state of the law under § 1001 as it would likely include 
more documents than what was available at the time of this research.  As of April 21, 2008, there are 1911 such 
documents, and the ones not included in this paper can be located by limiting the date of the documents displayed to 
those added after March 18th 2008. The vast majority of the documents located through this search were indeed plea 
agreements; however there was a small number of documents which represented jury verdicts and settlements; these 
documents were not discussed in the findings as they were outside the scope of this paper. 
141 There are eighty nine districts in fifty continental states.  
142 States not covered are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa,  Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming.  
143 The vast majority of the plea agreements were from the most recent years, 2005-2007.  
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government could have charged § 1001 but did not; 8) whether a defendant was given warnings 
that lying to the federal government was a federal felony; 9) whether the § 1001 charge resulted 
from a face to face interaction between a defendant and federal agents; 10) whether defendants 
were given warnings in such face to face interactions that lying was punishable under the federal 
law; and finally 11) in those instances where § 1001 conviction resulted from face to face 
interactions and defendants were not given warnings, whether § 1001 was the only count of 
conviction.144   
 Before addressing the findings of the research, a couple of points should be made 
regarding the methodology.  First, despite the best efforts to accurately determine the precise 
charges as well as the factual basis for each plea agreement, the information available on 
Westlaw was not always as complete as one could hope.  This was due to the format of some of 
the plea agreements, which did not contain “factual basis” as an integrated portion of the plea 
agreement and one had to look further to find such information.145  Sometimes, the information 
was available in the original criminal indictment, and such indictment was electronically linked 
to the plea agreement, and thus easy to locate. However, at other times, there was no such 
information available, and the author did not seek out additional information. Thus, the findings 
                                                 
144 There were several other parameters, which will not be addressed specifically in the paper: namely, the nature of 
the substantive charges defendants pleaded guilty to in addition to § 1001; if a defendant did not plead guilty under § 
1001, what were the substantive charges the defendant pleaded guilty to; and finally, whether the plea agreement 
contained a specific warning that failure to comply with the plea agreement and answer all questions truthfully 
would result in subsequent prosecution under § 1001.  This particular parameter turned out to be quite important due 
to the nature of the dataset researched. Since the keycite function pulled all the available documents which contained 
citing references to § 1001, many documents turned out not contain actual § 1001 charges but simply had references 
to § 1001 as warnings for future prosecutions.  There were 1041 such cases, and vast majority of them, 907, will be 
discarded for purposes of this paper, as the majority of them dealt with narcotics, firearms and similar charges, and 
based on the facts available, these did not implicate § 1001 in any way.  However, some of these “warnings only” 
documents were actually useful in another way, as examples of instances in which the government could have 
charged § 1001, but did not to do so and instead charged the defendant with the underlying substantive crime only. 
This is discussed infra pp 28-29.  
145 Unfortunately, the author did not keep track of the number of instances when it was necessary to look beyond the 
plea agreements to find information regarding the underlying facts.  
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are limited to whatever information was readily available on Westlaw, either in the plea 
agreement itself or in the underlying indictment.  
Second, in light of such limited information, the author was sometimes forced to make 
educated guesses. Given the commentators’ predictions regarding the overly expansive use of § 
1001, in those instances when a key piece of information was unavailable, the findings generally 
reflect the more conservative approach. For example, unless the plea agreement specifically 
mentioned multiple § 1001 charges, or such information was readily determinable by looking at 
the original indictment, the author assumed for purposes of this paper that the defendant was 
charged with only one count of § 1001.146  Additionally, for the guilty pleas arising out of written 
false statements submitted on governmental forms, the author treated all such forms as containing 
general warnings cautioning that submission of false statements constituted a federal crime.147  
On the other hand, however, the author took the contrary approach when factual scenarios 
involved face to face conversations between defendants and federal agents. In those instances, 
unless the facts clearly indicated so, the author assumed that the warnings were not given. The 
assumptions underlying this approach were further reinforced by the fact that there were several 
plea agreements which contained information indicating that government agents did give such 
warnings to defendants. Therefore, the author assumed that had such facts been available, they 
would have been included in the “statement of facts” in the plea agreement. 
 
                                                 
146 In light of many instances where prosecutors charged multiple § 1001 counts, it is probably safe to assume that 
more often than not, there were indeed multiple § 1001 counts.  
147 For example, the Application for a U.S. Passport contains the following warning: “WARNING: False statements 
made knowingly and willfully in passport applications, including affidavits or other documents submitted to support 
this application, are punishable by fine and/or imprisonment under the provisions of 18 USC 1001” (available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100004.pdf); The Social Security Form “Certificate of Responsibility 
for Welfare and Care of Child not in Applicant’s Custody” contains similar warnings: “I know that anyone who (a) 
makes or causes to be made any false statement or representation of a material fact for use in determining a right to 
or the amount of any payment, . . . commits a crime Punishable under Federal law by fine, imprisonment or both.” 
(available at http://www.ssa.gov/online/ssa-781.pdf).  
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2. The Basic Numbers 
Out of the 407 relevant148 plea agreements, defendants pleaded guilty to § 1001 in 231 
cases.  There were 172 cases where defendants pleaded solely to § 1001, while only 59 cases 
where defendants pleaded to § 1001 and to another crime. Out of the 172 cases where § 1001 was 
the only count of conviction, in 127 cases other substantive charges were dismissed in return for 
a guilty plea under § 1001.  In fifty nine cases, at least one count of § 1001 was dismissed in 
return for a guilty plea, with thirty five cases involving multiple § 1001 counts and defendants 
pleaded guilty to at least one § 1001 count while others were dismissed, and in twenty four cases 
§ 1001 count was dismissed in return for a guilty plea under a substantive charge.  In thirty eight 
cases the government promised not to charge § 1001 in return for a guilty plea under a 
substantive crime. There were 112 instances where defendants’ conduct fell within the scope of § 
1001, yet the government did not charge § 1001 and instead charged the underlying substantive 
crime only.149  As for the warnings given, out of 231 cases of guilty pleas under § 1001, in 133 
the government gave some type of warnings, usually because the nature of the crime involved 
submission of false statements on government forms.150 In rare instances, the government 
officials actually gave oral warnings that making materially false statements constituted a federal 
crime: there were 101 instances of face to face interactions and only 8 plea agreements indicating 
that oral warnings were given.  Further, out of the ninety three cases where § 1001 conviction 
resulted from face to face interactions between defendants and federal agents and no warnings 
                                                 
148 See supra note 144 for discussion on “warnings only” documents (there were additional 907 plea agreements, 
which did not implicate § 1001 substantively, and only contained warnings that any future false statements 
defendant makes would constitute a federal crime for which defendant may be prosecuted under § 1001. These plea 
agreements will not be further discussed.).  
149 These 112 cases were part of the “warnings only” plea agreements, see supra note 144, where § 1001 was 
implicated only as warning that failure to comply with the plea agreement and answer all questions truthfully would 
result in subsequent prosecution under § 1001.  However, the facts of these 112 cases fell clearly within the scope of 
§ 1001, yet defendants were not charged with it. The implications of this finding are discussed infra pp. 28-29.  
150 See supra note 147. 
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were given, in seventy three cases, § 1001 was the only crime defendants pleaded guilty to.  With 
these basic numbers in mind, we now turn to the implications of these findings.  
3. Plea Bargaining Practices - Overcharging  
Overcharging as a way of aggressive plea bargaining is nothing new in the criminal justice 
system and has been approved by the Supreme Court as a legitimate tool in plea bargaining.151  It 
is often utilized, both in the form of charging multiple counts and then dismissing some counts in 
exchange for a guilty plea for other counts, and in the form of promising not to add specific 
charges in return for a plea of guilty.  As previously suggested, some commentators feared that § 
1001 could be (ab)used for “pilling on” of charges, as each time a lie is repeated, “a separate 
count of the crime may be charged.”152  As these findings will show, such fears were founded.  
The survey of the plea agreements shows a relatively high ratio between the cases in which 
defendants pleaded guilty under § 1001 and those where § 1001 counts were either dismissed or 
not brought in exchange for guilty pleas under other charges.  For 231 guilty pleas under § 1001, 
there were 97 instances153 when § 1001 counts were either dismissed or the prosecutor promised 
not to charge § 1001 in exchange for a guilty plea under another statute.  This finding indicates 
that prosecutors often utilize § 1001 not only to obtain convictions under § 1001 but also as a 
way of inducing defendants to plead guilty under other charges.  If we add to these numbers the 
112 cases where defendants’ conduct clearly fell within the scope § 1001 but prosecutors did not 
bring § 1001 charges, the numbers are even higher, coming to a ratio of almost 1:1: for every      
                                                 
151 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (holding that a plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to 
avoid the possibility of a harsher penalty).  
152 See supra note 117.  
153 In 59 of those, § 1001 counts were dismissed, including 35 instances where some of the § 1001 counts were 
dismissed while the defendant pleaded guilty under other § 1001 counts. In 38, prosecutors agreed not to bring § 
1001 charges.  
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§ 1001 guilty plea, prosecutors agree to either dismiss § 1001 counts, or expressly or implicitly 
agree not to charge § 1001.   
These findings show that those commentators fearing that § 1001 would be used as a way 
to induce people to plead guilty have been most likely correct.  Aware that defendants, in an 
effort to avoid multiple felony convictions, or to avoid felony convictions all together, have every 
incentive to plead guilty when charged with, or at least aware of the possibility of being charged 
with §1001, prosecutors utilize § 1001 not only to obtain convictions under that particular statute, 
but are just as likely to use § 1001 to obtain convictions for other crimes.  While one can argue 
that this practice of using § 1001 to “pile on” offenses is no different from any other crime, as 
most misconduct is governed by more than one criminal provision and prosecutors can almost 
always pile on charges, § 1001 is arguably different as it often arises out of separate conduct, 
unrelated to the underlying misconduct that the government really wants to punish.  Furthermore, 
suspects, who may or may not be guilty of the underlying crime, are “almost certain to lie” and 
will “regrettably but humanly” not only profess their innocence but will offer “more than a flat 
denial.”  Thus, prosecutors can use § 1001 to pile on charges and obtain convictions when the 
underlying crime is hard to prove, or even worse, like in Martha Stewart’s case, when the 
underlying conduct turns out to be innocent.154  As one commentator cautioned, describing 
Martha Stewart’s case, “if a well-educated, wealthy person, aided by experienced defense 
counsel, was caught in the web of statutes and enforcement powers . . ., we should be very 
concerned about the plight of the more typical offender.”155
 
                                                 
154 See supra note 26.  
155 Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells us about White Collar Criminal Law, 43 HOUS. L. 
REV. 591, 619 (2006). 
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4. Restraint from charging § 1001 when clearly could have done so 
The number of cases in which the government could have charged, or at least threatened 
to charge defendants with § 1001, but did not do so, seems rather high as well.  Out of the plea 
agreements surveyed, for every three cases where prosecutors either charged or promised not to 
charge § 1001, there was one case where § 1001 did not play any role whatsoever even though 
defendants’ conduct fell clearly within the scope of the statute.156  Though this particular finding 
might be skewed due to the somewhat fortuitous way in which these plea agreements came to the 
author’s attention,157 there are at least a couple of observations worth mentioning.    
First, one way of looking at this statistic, as was suggested in the previous section, is to 
assume that in these types of situations defendants knew very well that their conduct could be 
punished under multiple statutes and they pleaded guilty to avoid increased charges at trial.  
Therefore, the fact that the § 1001 was not specifically mentioned in the plea agreement does not 
necessarily reflect positively on prosecutorial restraint. The very possibility that defendants’ 
conduct could have been prosecuted under § 1001 might have and probably did play a role in 
obtaining guilty pleas.   
Second, and more importantly, the fact that prosecutors chose to forgo charging § 1001 to 
obtain guilty pleas shows that § 1001 is not necessary to punish that criminal conduct which the 
statute was designed to prevent.  For example, while some prosecutors chose to prosecute lying 
to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under § 1001, other defendants 
                                                 
156 These plea agreements came to the author’s attention because they contained warnings that failure to comply 
with the plea agreement and answer all questions truthfully would result in subsequent prosecution under § 1001, 
see supra note 144.  
157 Id.  
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were prosecuted under the HUD-specific statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1012,158 which not only covers the 
same conduct, but it also provides a lesser punishment.159   
5. § 1001 is three times more likely to be the sole count of conviction 
Defendants are three times more likely to plead guilty to § 1001 as the sole count of 
conviction than to plead guilty to both § 1001 and to a substantive crime.  This finding is further 
divided into two: out of 172 cases in which defendants pleaded to § 1001 and to no substantive 
crime, in 90 cases other charges were dismissed in return for a guilty plea under § 1001; in 82 
other cases § 1001 was the sole count to being with.160 Again, there are several observations that 
can be made about these findings, all of which are rather disconcerting.  
First, the fact that defendants are three times more likely to plead guilty solely under § 
1001 as  opposed to both § 1001 and to substantive crimes seems to confirm the fears expressed 
by Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence and numerous commentators that government can rely on § 
1001 to punish conduct that is otherwise hard to convict.161  For example, one defendant pleaded 
guilty under § 1001 for falsely stating that he knew nothing about his restaurant building being 
intentionally destroyed by fire and that he did not claim insurance proceeds.162  Rather than 
charging him with a substantive crime, which would have likely required circumstantial evidence 
to establish defendant’s knowledge and involvement in the arson, it was certainly easier for 
                                                 
158 18 U.S.C. § 1012 provides:  
Whoever, with intent to defraud, makes any false entry in any book of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development or makes any false report or statement to or for such Department; or 
Whoever receives any compensation, rebate, or reward, with intent to defraud such Department or with intent 
unlawfully to defeat its purposes; or 
Whoever induces or influences such Department to purchase or acquire any property or to enter into any contract 
and willfully fails to disclose any interest which he has in such property or in the property to which such contract 
relates, or any special benefit which he expects to receive as a result of such contract-- 
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
159 See supra p. 2 for the full text of the statute.  Under § 1001, the maximum punishment is five years, while under 
§ 1012 the maximum punishment is only one year.  
160 As mentioned, defendants pleaded guilty to both § 1001 and a substantive crime in only 59 cases.  
161 See supra note 56.  
162 United States v. Coon, 2007 WL 3068978 (E.D. Mich. 2007).  
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prosecution to simply charge defendant with § 1001.  Defendant, undoubtedly fearful of the 
possible harsher penalty for any substantive crime, probably took the § 1001 offer eagerly.  
Similarly, in United States v. Pabon-Santiago163 the defendant pleaded guilty to violating 
§ 1001 for denying that she had been in Jacksonville with her co-defendant when in fact she had 
been there.  The investigators who had questioned her knew that she was lying as they found a 
receipt for a hotel in Jacksonville.164  Interestingly, the car driven by her and the co-defendant 
contained six kilograms of cocaine, yet defendant was not charged with any drug related offense. 
Why she was not charged with any substantive offense is not clear; it is possible that she was not 
the primary target of the investigation and it might have been difficult to prove that she knew that 
the drugs were in the car.  Regardless, it is safe to assume that when she was charged with § 1001 
as opposed to drug related offenses, the defendant jumped at the opportunity to plead guilty under 
§ 1001, fearing that any possible substantive crime would have carried a much harsher penalty.  
 On the other hand, while it is clear that prosecutors rely on § 1001 in circumstances where 
it would arguably be hard to obtain convictions otherwise, it is not clear that this is always to the 
defendants’ detriment.  For example, in the two cases discussed above, both defendants arguably 
benefited from pleading guilty under § 1001 because the government probably did not want to 
risk acquittal on the more serious charges.  In turn, the defendants were only punished under § 
1001 rather than receiving a more severe punishment that they arguably deserved.  The problem 
with that argument, however, is that it makes § 1001 a fall back crime: when the government 
can’t prove the underlying crime, investigators can induce defendants, who are almost certain to 
deny any wrongdoing, into lying and enable prosecutors to convict defendants under § 1001 
when they can’t convict for the substantive crime.  While one can arguably see this as benefiting 
                                                 
163 2005 WL 5872961 (M.D. Fl 2005).
164 This scenario is precisely what the commentators feared it would happen.  Here, the defendant was actually given 
Miranda warnings, but Miranda does not warn that lying is a separate crime. 
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defendants who escape the more serious punishment, this practice is precisely the sort of 
“manufacturing of crimes” which is far from the “information gathering” purpose that the 
original statute was designed to serve.  
6. Charging defendants with § 1001 when there is a substantive crime on point 
One of the surprising findings of this survey was the frequency with which prosecutors  
obtain guilty pleas under § 1001 even when there is a substantive crime on point.  Out of the 172 
cases where defendants pleaded guilty to § 1001 only, the vast majority of them, if not all165 
could have been prosecuted under another crime.166  On the other hand, there were 112 cases 
where defendants’ conduct clearly fell within the scope of § 1001 but prosecutors chose to charge 
the substantive crimes only. Even more interestingly, the conduct in the latter category was often 
extremely similar to the types of charges brought under § 1001, most notably fraud perpetrated 
on governmental agencies such as the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) agency, or 
various social security fraud schemes.167  
What was often the only distinguishing factor among these cases was the jurisdiction 
where the charges were brought.168 In most jurisdictions surveyed, § 1001 was often utilized as 
                                                 
165 Again, it is questionable whether those false statements made in the course of a criminal investigation could have 
been prosecuted under any other statute.  
166 Examples include applying for housing benefits and failing to disclose that the son was receiving social security 
benefits which could have been prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1012 (United States v. Timmons, 2007 WL 3311382 
(M.D. Fla. 2007)); marriage fraud to obtain immigration benefits could have been prosecuted under 8 U.S.C. § 
1325(c) (United States v. Ezeh, 2006 WL 4914651 (M.D. Fla. 20060)).  
167 Examples include charging defendant with theft of government money under 18 U.S.C. § 641 for submitting false 
statements to obtain social security supplemental income, rather than charging § 1001 (United States v. Blake, 2007 
WL 3311464 (N.D. Ill. 2007)); charging defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1383a(a)(3) for fraudulently obtaining social 
security supplemental income benefits as opposed to § 1001 (United States v. Cooper-Cooley, 2006 WL 4977053 
(N.D. Ill. 2006)); charging defendant with filing false tax returns under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) as opposed to § 1001 
(United States v. Greve, 2006 WL 4973467 (N.D. Ill. 2006)). 
168 For example, in Northern District of Illinois, there were 98 cases in which the government could have brought § 
1001 charges but did not do so. On the other hand, other jurisdictions had only a handful of such cases: Eastern 
District of California had 4 cases; Western District of Louisiana: 1 case; District of Massachusetts: 1 case; District 
of Maryland: 1 case; Eastern District of Michigan: 2 cases; Eastern District of Virginia: 1 case; Southern District of 
Texas: 1 case, Western District of New York: 1 case; Northern District of New York: 1 case; and Eastern District of 
North Carolina: 1 case. This large discrepancy is in part due to a vastly different numbers of available plea 
agreements from each of these districts. Northern District of Illinois had by far the largest number of plea 
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the primary tool for enforcement of fraud perpetrated on governmental programs.  In those 
jurisdictions, all sorts of various criminal behavior was simply prosecuted under § 1001, 
regardless of whether it was social security fraud, immigration, or HUD fraud.  On the other 
hand, in the Northern District of Illinois, for example, where the U.S. Attorneys showed the most 
restraint in using § 1001, defendants generally pleaded guilty under the specific statutes rather 
than the broad, all encompassing § 1001.  
There are several points to be made about this finding.  First, while one might question 
the importance of these distinctions, especially in cases where the underlying punishment is the 
same, this haphazard, discretionary approach to federal criminal law threatens the integrity and 
efficacy of the law.169  If certain conduct is prosecuted under one statute in one federal district 
and under another statute in another federal district, this can certainly lead to uncertainty and 
lack of uniformity in enforcement of federal crimes.  Unlike state laws, which by definition 
differ from state to state, the federal criminal justice system is supposed to operate uniformly on 
the national level.  
Second, and more importantly, it is rather strange and extremely unfair to have one 
defendant, in one district, plead guilty, for example, under § 18 U.S.C. 1012170 which prohibits 
making of false statements to the HUD, and be sentenced to a maximum one year in prison, for 
the same conduct that another defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and sentenced to a 
maximum of five years in a different district.171  Same reasoning applies when § 1001 is used to 
                                                                                                                                                             
agreements available (496), whereas there were only a few plea agreements available from other districts such as 
District of Massachusetts (2), District of Maryland (2), or Eastern District of Michigan (18).  Nonetheless, the 
discrepancy in numbers is large enough to suggest a real jurisdictional difference in prosecutorial reliance on § 
1001.  
169 See supra notes 18-19 (Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells us about White Collar 
Criminal Law, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 591, 619 (2006)). 
170 For the full text of § 1012 see supra, note 158.  
171 Compare United States v. Ware, 2006 WL 4915630 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (defendant pleaded guilty under § 1001 for 
making false statements to the Department of Housing and Urban Development) with United States v. Ernst, 2005 
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defendant’s benefit,172 as for each of those instances, there is another defendant who is charged 
with the substantive crime arising out of similar facts, with a more serious punishment. The 
outcome is the same – unjustifiable, disparate treatment for the same conduct.173   
Had Congress intended prosecutors to use § 1001 to punish conduct that is covered by 
another more specific statute, then Congress would not have enacted those more specific statutes. 
For one, such practice renders the specific statutes superfluous and unnecessary.174  And second, 
the specific provisions targeting a particular issue are there for a reason; they represent a 
judgment of Congress as to the appropriate punishment for a particular conduct.  
7. Warnings 
Finally, the findings regarding the frequency and types of factual scenarios when 
warnings were given are probably the most concerning.  In 231 instances where defendants 
pleaded guilty to § 1001, warnings were given in 133 cases.  However, those cases included 125 
instances of § 1001 charges arising out of submission of false statements on some type of 
governmental forms, all of which contain warnings that submission of false statements 
constitutes a federal felony.175   
The more interesting and worrisome were the cases of face to face interactions between 
federal investigators and various defendants. There were 101 cases where defendants pleaded 
                                                                                                                                                             
WL 5902939 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (defendant pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 1012 for making false statements to the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development). 
172 Compare United States v. Arajuo, 2007 WL 2718617 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (defendant pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1542, “False Statement in Application for Passport,” which provides for a maximum penalty of ten years 
imprisonment) with United States v. Orozco, 2008 WL 345625 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (defendant pleaded guilty under § 
1001, which provides for a maximum penalty of five years, for submitting false statements on a passport 
application). 
173 One can certainly argue, and be largely correct to say that these prosecutorial charging decisions reflect exercise 
of (almost) unreviewable discretion which reflects a judgment call regarding culpability of any given defendant. 
However, just because that is the current state of the law does not mean that it should not be criticized.  
174This concern has specifically been raised in the context of securities laws enforcement, as the enactment of § 1001 
with its low standard of criminal liability rendered certain securities laws arguably superfluous. See Arthur F. 
Mathews et al., 1990 Securities Enforcement Review, 741 PLI/CORP 85 (1991).  
175 See supra note 147.  
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guilty to § 1001 based on materially false statements given in some type of face to face 
interactions with federal investigators.  Out of those, in more than ninety percent of the cases, 
ninety three to be precise, no warnings were given. Examples of such factual scenarios include: 
defendant falsely claimed that he did not know the identity of the individual who caused certain 
explosion when “he did know the identity of the individual who had caused said explosion”176 
(there was no substantive charge and no warnings); defendant falsely told an FBI agent that he 
was not sure and could not tell one way or another whether his brother wanted to become a 
suicide bomber when in effect defendant had a letter from his brother saying that he did177 (no 
substantive charge and no warnings); two defendants were charged with § 1001 for stating that 
they did not know where certain drugs came from and for failing to provide further information 
to the FBI regarding the underlying crime178 (neither defendant was charged with any 
substantive crime and there were no warnings).  Furthermore, out of the ninety three cases when 
no warnings were given in face to face encounters, in sixty eight cases § 1001 was the only crime 
defendants pleaded guilty to.  Thus, about 70% of the cases involving face to face interactions 
represent precisely the types of factual scenarios commentators feared would result in § 1001 
charges: where defendants are questioned about criminal activity, not given warnings that lying 
is a crime, and then convicted solely under § 1001 and for no substantive crime.   
  One can arguably see this trend as benefiting defendants who avoid multiple charges. 
Furthermore, it would certainly seem anomalous to advocate that prosecutors charge § 1001 only 
                                                 
176 United States v. Alba, 2005 WL 5902999 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (though the ATF agents did identify themselves as 
such, the facts in the plea agreement do not indicate that defendant was given any type of warning that lying to the 
agents would constitute a federal crime. The defendant was only charged with § 1001 and no substantive crime). 
177 United States v. Subeh, 2007 WL 4664387 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (the facts of this case are rather remarkable and 
were described in the introduction. Defendant “suspected” his brother wanted to become a suicide bomber, and 
defendant actually tried to stop him. But, because he was questioned by the FBI, and no warnings were given to him 
explaining that lying to the FBI constituted a federal felony, defendant was convicted for § 1001.). 
178 United States v. Lewis, 2006 WL 5051925 (W.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Lewis, 2006 WL 5051929 
(W.D.N.Y. 2006).
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in addition to the substantive crime, as that would constitute precisely the type of “piling on” of 
offenses commentators feared.  However, the frequent absence of substantive charges in these 
cases seems to indicate that prosecutors use § 1001 when they are unable to prove the underlying 
crime.  Furthermore, since these cases often occur “under extremely informal circumstances 
which do not sufficiently alert the person interviewed to the danger that false statements may 
lead to a felony conviction,”179 this practice resembles, as discussed above,180 “manufacturing of 
crimes”: if suspects are unaware that making materially false statements is a federal felony, they 
are “very likely to lie,” and federal investigators can “set up violations that they fully expect to 
occur.”  Since prosecutors seem to rely on § 1001 in such instances, defendants should at least 
get the benefit of warnings. 
 
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?  
As previously suggested,181 there have been several proposals made for restricting the 
broad scope of § 1001.  One of easiest way to overcome problems addressed in this paper is to 
hope that prosecutors will not continue to bring charges under § 1001 in the circumstances such 
as described above, both with respect to informal interviews when defendants are not given 
specific warnings as well as in those instances when there is a specific criminal statute on point. 
However, at least with respect to the first problem, even at the time Brogan was indicted and 
convicted, the Department of Justice had a policy against bringing § 1001 prosecutions for 
statements amounting to an “exculpatory no.”182  The United State’s Attorney’s Manual “firmly 
                                                 
179 See supra part II (Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence).  
180 See supra p. 31.  
181 See supra, part II. 
182 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 415.  
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declared”183 that “‘where the statements take the form of an ‘exculpatory no,’ 18 U.S.C. § 1001 
does not apply regardless of who asks the question.’”184  Yet despite this policy, Brogan and 
countless other defendants were convicted under § 1001 precisely under the scenario envisioned 
by the Justice Department.  After the Brogan holding that prosecutions for falsely denying guilt 
can be sustained under the broad language of § 1001”185 the only impediment between the DOJ 
and an easy conviction is the practically un-reviewable prosecutorial discretion.  
 Many of the proposals suggested by various commentators186 would certainly help 
ameliorate the harsh consequences of § 1001’s broad scope, and would achieve the uniformity of 
application and a sense of fairness in criminalizing the conduct that the statute was designed to 
prevent.187  Specifically, giving all interviewees warnings, not only that they have the right to 
remain silent, but more importantly that lying is a federal felony, would increase compliance 
with § 1001’s purpose of “information gathering” as opposed to “crime manufacturing.”  Of the 
plea agreements surveyed, there were several instances, though extremely few, when specific 
warnings were given, cautioning defendants that lying was a separate crime. For example, a 
confidential informant who was supposed to arrange to buy a firearm, but instead stole the 
money and lied that he was robbed, was specifically warned that lying was a crime;188 another 
defendant was interviewed regarding a real estate loan application and was specifically told that 
lying was a crime.189  Though these particular defendants still lied despite the warnings that 
lying was a crime, the fact that they were given warnings certainly contributed to the legitimacy 
and fairness of their convictions.  Furthermore, giving such warnings would possibly increase 
                                                 
183 Id.  
184 Id. at 415 (quoting the United States Attorney’s Manual & para; 9-42.160 (Oct. 1, 1988)).  
185 Brogan, 522 U.S. 415.  
186 See supra part II.  
187 See supra part I.  
188 United States v. Hernandez, 2007 WL 3299334 (E.D. Wash. 2007).  
189 United States v. Martinez, 2007 WL 2764296 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  
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the odds that the defendant would either choose to remain silent and thus not mislead the 
investigators, or would choose to tell the truth which would help the “information gathering” 
function of federal agencies. 
 Other proposals for amending the statute, namely requiring that knowledge of 
unlawfulness be an element of the crime, as well as changing the materiality standard to require 
that the false statement actually mislead or obstruct the government's investigation would both 
improve the haphazard way in which the § 1001 is currently utilized.  The knowledge element 
would likely achieve similar results to those achieved by mandatory warnings: it would 
hopefully result in fewer defendants giving false statements and misleading investigators; 
second, it would certainly be more fair to hold criminally liable those defendants who knowingly 
choose to lie as opposed to those who do so “regrettably but humanly.”  Further, interpreting the 
materiality element as requiring that the lie actually mislead or obstruct the government’s 
investigation would be entirely consistent with the original purpose of the statute which was to 
“protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies.”  With all due 
respect to Justice Scalia’s view that it would be “exceedingly strange” to distinguish disbelieved 
from believed falsehoods, that is precisely what needs to happen, as disbelieved falsehoods do 
not impede government functions in any way.190  On the contrary, disbelieve falsehoods only 
serve to convict defendants whose substantive crimes are “otherwise hard to prove.”  
 Finally, prosecutors should certainly be required to charge defendants with specific 
criminal statute, if available, rather than relying on the broad language of § 1001. As explained 
                                                 
190 Furthermore, though materiality is similarly defined in other areas of the law as an objective element, for 
example as requiring that information “assumes actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable [person],” 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (addressing the test for materiality under Rule 10b-5 of the 
Securities and Exchange Act) (emphasis added), reliance element often serves as a limiting factor, requiring that the 
person alleging material misrepresentation actually relied on such statements.  Since § 1001 does not contain 
reliance as one of the elements, materiality requirement should be interpreted to require that the material statements 
actually affect government functions in order to preserve the limited purpose of § 1001.  
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above,191 in those instances where maximum punishments are different, charging defendants 
with § 1001 as opposed to the substantive crime both defies Congressional determination as to 
how severely certain conduct should be punished, as well as makes the specific statutes 
“superfluous and unnecessary.” 
CONCLUSION 
Section 1001 as well as Brogan have prompted many commentators to address the 
potential problems associated with the broad scope of § 1001 and to predict the impact Brogan 
would have on subsequent prosecutions under § 1001.  Though this empirical data might not 
paint as bleak of a picture of prosecutorial reliance on § 1001 as commentators feared, the data 
certainly suggest that there is much inconsistency in the way § 1001 is utilized among different 
jurisdictions, and confirms that prosecutors do often prosecute defendants who have not been 
warned that lying is a federal felony under § 1001 for falsely denying their guilt.  Therefore, 
Congress should amend the statute to require that warnings be given, to impose the knowledge of 
unlawfulness as an element of the crime, to redefine the materiality element, and finally, to 
require prosecutors to charge specific statutes whenever available rather than rely on the all 
encompassing § 1001.  
                                                 
191 See supra part III.  
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